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B2B WEB SITES, ANTITRUST CONCERNS,
AND THE RULE OF REASON
MICHAEL E. COMERFORDi
INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a dramatic proliferation of
Business to Business (B2B) Web sites.' B2B Web sites have
been described as electronic marketplaces that utilize the
Internet to electronically connect businesses. 2 The B2B venture
brings together otherwise competing firms in order to build
electronic exchanges.3  Electronic exchanges are software
systems that enable buyers and sellers to purchase goods using
industry-wide computer systems.4 The sites are formed because
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law; B.S.,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
I See Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Antitrust Enforcers "Click On" B2Bs,
ANTITRUST COMMENT., July 2000, at 1. [hereinafter Jones Day] C"[B2Bs] create
online exchanges or sites for the purchase and sale of goods and services between
companies."), available at http-/Avwwl.jonesday.com/FILES/tbl-s3lPublications/File
Uploadl37/269/Antitrust..Enforcers.pdf.
2 See Federal Trade Commission Staff, Entering the 21st Century: Competition
Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces, October 2000, Introduction, at 1
[hereinafter FTC Staff Report], at http'//www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breport.pdf.
Within the FTC Staff Report, B2Bs are defined as "electronic marketplaces... [that
enable] transactions [to] occur online through the support of the Internet." Id. pt. 1,
at 1. The report, generated by the FTC staff, sought to provide a summary of a
workshop held to discuss new B2B technology and also to provide an understanding
of how traditional antitrust questions should be answered in the face of new B2B
technology. See id. Introduction, at 2.
3 See Harry S. Davis & William F. Sullivan, Antitrust Issues in the Electronic
Age: Practical Considerations for Firms That Do Business on the Web - Part I,
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES PoL'Y REP., Nov. 2000, at 12 (stating B2B ventures have
proliferated dramatically on the Internet, involving both "old economy" industries
and many "new economy" ventures); FTC, FTC Staff Issues Report on Competition
Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces, at
httpJ/ww-v.ftc.gov/opa/2000/10/b2breport.htm (Oct. 26, 2000) ("B2B electronic
marketplaces use the Internet to electronically connect businesses with each other,
primarily for purposes of buying and selling a wide variety of goods and services.").
4 See FTC, Public Workshop: Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic
Marketplaces, at http//www.ftc.gov/os/2000/O5/b2bworkshopfrn.htm (last visited
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of the potential savings that will benefit both the participating
businesses and the consumers of their products.5 "Almost every
major industry has ventured into creating some type of B2B
Internet marketplace...."-6 The formation of B2B information
exchange sites represents a potentially large part of the new
Internet economy.7 This Note will focus on B2B Web auctions,
where industries including automobile, airline, healthcare, and
electricity are formulating reverse auctions. 8 Reverse auctions
are driven by buyers and allow multiple sellers to bid in order to
provide products to individual buyers.9
This large investment, by almost every major industry in the
B2B Internet marketplace, has raised a number of concerns
March 28, 2002) (discussing the recent development of B2B web sites that link
competitors with suppliers to meet the competitors' purchasing needs); FTC Staff
Report, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 4 ("The Internet makes B2Bs possible."). The report
indicates that businesses can exchange information easily and efficiently due to the
predominance and ease of connectivity to the Internet. Id. Businesses with varying
"legacy systems" can access the universal browser without complex installations.
See id. The term "legacy systems" refers to systems that automated B2B commerce
prior to the advent of the Internet. See id., pt. 1, at 2.
5 See David Leonhardt, Business Links on Web Raise Antitrust Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2000, at Al (stating that the exchanges create the opportunity to
save millions of dollars in back office costs); Lauren Gibbons Paul, The Biggest
Gamble Yet, CIO MAG., Apr. 15, 2000 (stating that an automobile electronic
exchange could reduce work in progress inventory costs, which currently cost
consumers about $310 for every new vehicle sold), http://www.cio.com/archivel
041500/gamble.html.
6 Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, B2B Web Site: Works in Progress, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 15, 2000, at 3; see also Andrea Foster, B2Bs Raise Antitrust Concerns, NAT'L
L.J., May 8, 2000, at B1 (discussing recently formulated B2B sites in the auto
industry, meatpacking industry, and airline industry).
7 See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that B2B Web sites currently
have $150 billion in annual sales, which are expected to grow to $6 trillion in five
years); Jenna Greene, B2B: New Target for Antitrust, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 2000,
at 1, 11 (analysts believe B2B transactions will make up over half of all Internet
commerce and may represent sales of as much as $7.29 trillion), available at
http'//www5.aw.com/dc-shl/display.cfn?id=3509&query=B2B.
8 See FTC Enforcers Believe B2B Auctions Are Similar to JVs, FTC WATCH,
Apr. 10, 2000, at aai [hereinafter FTC Enforcers].
9 See FTC Staff Report, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 10. Prices will move downward
within a reverse auction. Id. The general procedure followed in a reverse auction is
for a buyer to issue a "request for quotation." See id. The quotation will specify
product requirements and commercial terms. See id. Sellers whom the buyer wishes
to participate will be designated and those sellers will prepare and submit bids
during the auction. See id. The auction may be organized so that the lowest bid
automatically wins. See id. Alternatively, where a higher price is due to the quality
of the product or other considerations, the buyer may decide not to award the
contract to the lowest bidder. See id.
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within the field of antitrust law.10 The potential for collusion by
B2B participants has been the chief anticompetitive concern
addressed by commentators. 1  The antitrust concerns of
potential collusive behavior within the B2B marketplace are
countered by the large procompetitive benefits that B2B
electronic marketplaces bring to the Internet economy. 12
Another potential anticompetitive antitrust concern raised by
B2B electronic marketplaces may be characterized as
exclusionary practices or limitations on participation.13 Such
limitations on participation can consist of the preclusion of
parties from participating in the B2B site, the exclusion of
parties who join a B2B site from using other B2B sites, or
agreement among competitors as to the manner in which they
will deal with prospective B2B participants. 14
The collaboration to form a B2B site is generally viewed as a
joint venture between competitors within a particular industry. 5
As such, B2B Web sites should be viewed as "presumptively
lawful."16 Where a B2B is alleged to have participated in
anticompetitive conduct, antitrust analysis should fall under
10 See Joseph Guinto, Surging 'B2B" Web Deals Draw Antitrust Scrutiny,
INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, July 13, 2000, at A22 (discussing potential antitrust
concern of illegal collusion among B2B participants); Matt Hicks, Fair Exchange? As
the Big Boys Form B2B Exchanges, Some Fear Competition May Suffer, EWEEK,
July 17, 2000, at 49 (noting that when competitors collaborate there is always the
potential for antitrust issues to arise); Robert A. Schwinger, Antitrust Dark Side
Lurking On Web? E-Commerce Sites Boon to Many, but What Is Effect on
Competition?, N.Y. L.J., June 12, 2000, at S1 (stating that the threat that B2B Web
sites may lead to illicit collusion has raised the interest of antitrust regulators).
11 See, e.g., Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 6, at 3, 6 (stating that there are
concerns about the potential for formulating collusive price agreements through the
instantaneous exchange of cost and price information).
12 See Jeffrey P. Weingart & Jennifer L. Gray, B2B Internet Marketplaces,
NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at Bli ("In theory... greater price transparency should
reduce the costs... [of] negotiating... and should force firms to bid more
aggressively, [thereby] bringing prices to their most competitive levels.").
13 See Richard E. Donovan, Online "Business-to-Business" Enterprises Raise
Antitrust Issues, 10 LEGAL OPINION LETTER, Aug. 11, 2000, at 1.
14 See id.
Is See id.; see also FTC Enforcers, supra note 8, at aai (stating that B2B
auctions will receive the same scrutiny from enforcement agencies as joint
ventures). A joint venture is defined as "[a] legal entity in the nature of a
partnership engaged in the joint undertaking of a particular transaction for mutual
profit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (6th ed. 1990).
16 Donovan, supra note 13, at I (citing William Blumenthal, B2B Internet
Exchanges: The Antitrust Basics, ANTITRUST REP., May 2000, at 39).
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section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.'7 As interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, section 1 analysis entails review
of any alleged anticompetitive restraint to determine whether
the "challenged restraint enhances competition." 8 Section 1 of
the Sherman Act states, "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal."19
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of section
1 has shaped the application of the Sherman Act within the field
of antitrust law.20 The Supreme Court has developed two
methods of analysis for conduct that allegedly violates section 1:
a per se rule and a rule of reason.21 This Note will focus upon
rule of reason analysis because its application has been
expanded to include many types of business conduct alleged to
have anticompetitive effects. 22  Additionally, rule of reason
analysis is used in reviewing most of the accusations of
anticompetitive restraints that a B2B site might fall prey to
under section 1.23 B2B Web sites are utilized as information
exchanges, and one prominent use is the exchange of price and
17 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also FTC & DOJ, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 2 (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES] (explaining that "'competitor collaboration' [which is] comprise[d] [of]
a set of one or more agreements ... between or among competitors to engage in
economic activity, and the economic activity resulting therefrom [sic]," is to be
analyzed under the antirust guidelines), available at http'J/www.ftc.gov/os/1999/
9910/jointventureguidelines.htm.
18 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
20 See James E. Hartley et al., The Rule ofReason, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST
1 (discussing the development of antitrust law by the United States Supreme Court
after the passage of the Sherman Act).
21 See id. at 1 ("[Al rule of reason that examines all the competitive effects of
the challenged conduct before the determination of 'reasonableness' is made, and a
per se rule that treats certain practices as being so clearly anti-competitive as to be
conclusively 'unreasonable.'") (citation omitted).
22 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New
Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994)
("[Clourts have grown disillusioned with the absolutism of the per se rule and have
been more inclined to consider efficiency justifications for competitive restraints.").
23 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 5 ("The Supreme Court has stated that the
rule of reason is the 'prevailing standard of analysis,' and that the rule of reason is
'applied for the majority of anti-competitive practices challenged under section 1 of
the Act.'") (quoting Contl T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49, 59
(1977)); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979).
ANTITRUST AND B2B WEB SITES
cost information. 24 Historically, under section 1, exchanges of
price and cost information have been evaluated under the rule of
reason.
25
B2B sites are given widespread attention by the media, as
well as regulatory agencies, making it likely that allegations a
B2B Web site is restraining competition in violation of section 1
will arise.26 The predominant issue then, is whether antitrust
law can effectively analyze anticompetitive restraints under the
rule of reason as interpreted by courts and regulatory agencies.
This Note asserts two conclusions. First, the rule of reason
analysis is inadequate to review B2B ventures at this time. B2B
Web sites are in their infancy and there is very little information
on whether their overall economic effect will be procompetitive or
anticompetitive. This lack of information is problematic, as rule
of reason analysis is premised upon balancing anticompetitive
effects on competition against procompetitive effects on
competition. Each side requires economic analysis, and unless a
court wishes to rely on economic theory and proceed with limited
facts, B2B Web sites must be allowed more time to develop.
Second, even when B2B Web sites do develop and there is
greater certainty as to their economic effect on competition, rule
24 See Janet Kidd Stewart, The Middle Marches Toward the Internet;
Distributors Add New Services and Create E-Markets to Ensure Survival in
Uncertain Times, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 2000, at C1 (stating that prices for supplies
will likely fall as cost information becomes transparent and purchasers are able to
choose among different bids). The article further discusses how B2B Web sites may
lead to the cutting of sales forces, distributors, and buyers. See id. These reductions
according to the author will largely be due to reductions in costs related to
purchasing. See id. The on-line electronic marketplace will lead to increased
automation and the potential for reductions in warehousing as manufacturers
become more efficient due to improved technology. See id.
25 See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 6, at 3, 6 (stating that historically the
exchange of price and cost information has been analyzed under the rule of reason
when applying the Sherman Act); FTC Staff Report, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 5 (stating
that agreements to share information are normally analyzed under section 1
utilizing the rule of reason).
26 The Federal Trade Commission has already completed an investigation into
Covisint, the auto manufacturer's B2B Web site. See FTC, Covisint Letter, Sept. 11,
2000, at http'//www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/covisintchrysler.htm ("Upon further review of
this matter, it now appears that no further action is warranted by the Commission
at this time.") (emphasis added). Although the site has been allowed to continue its
operations, the FTC did express reservations about Covisint's future activities. See
id.; Christopher Marquis, U.S. Approves Formation of Supply Web Site for
Automakers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at C1 (discussing the approval of Covisint
by the FTC, but also stating that the FTC is unsure if implementation will cause
competitive concerns).
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of reason analysis will still be an empty test.27 This Note asserts
that it is essential for the Supreme Court to guide federal courts
and regulatory agencies by issuing specific guidelines on how to
approach rule of reason analysis. In light of the lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court in analyzing accusations of
anticompetitive restraints under the rule of reason, determining
what constitutes appropriate conduct in forming B2B Web sites
remains unpredictable.
Part I of this Note discusses the judicial development of
antitrust law over the past one hundred years. The history
demonstrates how the Supreme Court has molded analysis of
anticompetitive restraints under section 1 so that the prevailing
standard is the rule of reason; however, the Court has failed to
clearly explain how rule of reason analysis should be conducted.
Part II of this Note explains how the Supreme Court, circuit
courts of appeals, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
Department of Justice (DOJ) currently approach rule of reason
analysis. Part III discusses the particular procompetitive
benefits that B2B Web sites bring to the new hi-tech economy
and how balancing competitive factors under the rule of reason
is inadequate when attempting to determine whether an
antitrust violation under section 1 has occurred.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTITRUST LAw
The language in section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
encompasses all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade.28 Historically, the Court applied a rule of per
se illegality;29 however, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,30
the Supreme Court ruled that section 1 governed only undue
restraints of trade.31 The Court stated:
27 See Piraino, supra note 22, at 1754 (opining that the "rule of reason
[analysis] has no substantive content"). Piraino states that rule of reason analysis is
currently "one of the more vexing problems in antitrust law." Id. at 1755 (quoting
David A. Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, the Rule of Reason and the General
Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1239, 1249 (1984)).
28 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
29 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 35-36 ("[Tlhe Court implicitly established a
rule of per se of [sic] illegality by rejecting intent as a justification for the
agreement. ... "). The author was discussing United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the first substantive antitrust case decided by
the Supreme Court. Id. at 34.
30 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
31 See id. at 59-60. The Court stated, "[Section 1] under this view evidenced the
[Vol.75:649
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[I]t was intended that the standard of reason which had been
applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with
subjects of the character embraced by the statute was intended
to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether,
in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about
the wrong against which the statute provided.32
Standard Oil provided that in future cases courts should
determine whether an alleged restraint on competition would be
evaluated under the rule of per se illegality or the rule of
reason.33 Examining the application over the past one hundred
years of rule of reason analysis by the Supreme Court under
section 1 demonstrates a blending of the per se and rule of
reason analyses and indicates a lack of guidance from the Court
for conducting a full rule of reason analysis.
In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 34 the Supreme
Court offered a list of factors to be utilized in rule of reason
analysis that remains in use today.35 The Court stated that all
agreements with respect to trade do restrain; thus, the question
becomes whether the restraint promotes competition or
suppresses competition.3 6 To determine, under rule of reason
analysis, the effect a restraint has on competition, the Court
listed the following factors:
IThe facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. [Additionally,] [tihe history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
[and] the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.37
intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts... which did not
unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from
being restrained by methods... which would constitute an inference-that is, an
undue restraint." Id. at 60.
32 Id.
33 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 46 (explaining that Standard Oil established
both the per se rule and the complete rule of reason test).
This Note focuses upon the rule of reason since most antitrust concerns
expressed about B2B sites are likely to be evaluated under the rule of reason. See
Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 6, at 3.
34 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
35 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 102 ("[Courts still cite the original description
of the rule of reason found in Chicago Board of Trade.").
36 See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
37 Id. at 238.
2001]
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These factors became guidelines for future judicial decisions
when evaluating whether an alleged restraint was
anticompetitive in its overall effect. 38 Determining the degree of
complexity to be applied under the rule of reason analysis,
however, remains difficult.3 9
The Court applied the Chicago Board of Trade factors in
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States using a rule of reason
analysis.40 Appalachian Coals involved an allegation of price
fixing by over 100 coal producers. 41 The Court concluded that
the agreement between the defendants was not an undue
restraint on competition.42 Although Appalachian Coals is a
clear example of how to apply the Chicago Board of Trade
factors, the proper amount of analysis to be used in analyzing
B2B Web sites accused of restraining competition remains
unclear. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the degree of
analysis applied in Appalachian Coals is proper in every section
1 antitrust case. After Appalachian Coals, there was a period of
approximately thirty years in which the Supreme Court focused
upon the per se rule as the appropriate mode of analysis.43
38 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]he rule of reason is the 'prevailing
standard of analysis,' and... is 'applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices
challenged under Section 1 of the [Sherman Antitrust] Act.'") (citing Cont T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49, 59 (1977)); see also Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
39 See Clanton, supra note 27, at 1249 (stating that determining how much
analysis is needed under the rule of reason "remains one of the more vexing
problems of antitrust law").
40 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 361 (1933) ("[T]he
application of the statute is [a question] of intent and effect, and is not to be
determined by arbitrary assumptions."). In applying the rule of reason test, the
Court looked at the following factors: the economic conditions within the coal
industry, industry practices, defendant's plan for sales, why the sales plan was
adopted, and the consequences of carrying out the sales plan on market prices and
other factors. See id.
41 See id. at 357-58 (stating that defendants had formed "an exclusive selling
agency" through which prices were to be fixed).
42 See id. at 375 (stating that the defendants had "no intent or power to fix
prices," that many competitive opportunities remained in the market, and that
there was no evidence to show a detrimental effect on competition within the
market).
4 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 53 ("Appalachian Coals was clearly limited in
its effect by the series of cases that followed."). After acknowledging Appalachian
Coals, the author discusses the next prominent antitrust case, United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), which displaced Appalachian Coals
and provided a conclusive per se approach to judicial analysis during the post-World
War H era. See id. at 54.
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Rule of reason analysis became more prevalent after the
landmark antitrust decision of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.4 Continental T.V. marked the Court's initial
willingness to abandon a per se rule that failed to conform to
modern economic thinking.45  Continental T.V. involved a
franchise agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer.46
The Court sought to determine the appropriate analysis under
section 1 of the Sherman Act for the imposed restrictions. 47 The
specific dispute centered upon a claim that the defendant,
Sylvania, was in violation of section 1 because it had entered into
and enforced franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of its
products from unauthorized locations. 48 The Court revisited its
decision in Standard Oil to determine whether antitrust analysis
of vertical restraints should be under the rule of reason or under
the per se rule.49 Upon concluding that the appropriate standard
Two decisions by the Supreme Court subsequent to Socony-Vacuum Oil
illustrate when per se treatment is appropriate and, conversely, why rule of reason
analysis has risen to be the prevailing method of analysis under section 1. In N.
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court established the presumption
that there are "certain agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal." Id. at 5. The Court's statement helped show
how a "bright-line test" of per se illegality can be useful where it is obvious that
challenged conduct under section 1 is most likely harming competition and offering
no benefit to consumers. See Hartley, supra note 20, at 55-56.
Nonetheless, certain doctrinal issues that arose around 1970 helped lead to the
rise of rule of reason analysis. See id. at 61-62. These doctrinal issues focused on
the illusory nature of per se rules, since deciding whether a restraint of trade was
forbidden under section 1 often required characterization, labeling, and analysis.
See id. at 61. These considerations lead to "the question of whether the per se rule
and the rule of reason are two separate alternative modes of analysis; or, instead,
the ends of a continuum." Id. (citation omitted). "The rise of rule of reason
analysis ... likely is linked to these doctrinal issues." Id at 62.
4 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
45 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 63 (stating that the Supreme Court retained
both methods of analysis under section 1, but focused more on the question of
whether a restraint would benefit or injure consumer welfare). Future cases raised
numerous new questions, such as: "When should anticompetitive effects be
presumed? When should defendants be allowed to show that their conduct is not
harmful to competition? What justifications offered for a restraint are appropriate
in evaluating a Section 1 claim? How detailed should the evaluation of such
justifications be?" Id.
46 See Cont7 T.V., 433 U.S. at 37.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 40.
49 See id. at 49. The Court proceeded to compare the rule of reason and the per
se rule, noting, "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to
conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." Id at 49-50. Citing Northern Pacific
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was the rule of reason, the Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals.50 The court of appeals had concluded that,
given all the circumstances, the threat of competitive harm was
not substantial enough to warrant per se analysis.51  In
affirming, however, the Supreme Court went further and held
that per se analysis was only appropriate in vertical restraint
cases when "based upon [a] demonstrable economic effect." 52
Continental T.V. has been described as "a watershed opinion 53
because a new approach to antitrust analysis was formulated,
one which is followed to the present day.54  The opinion
reinforced the notion that the rule of reason is the prevailing
method of analysis under section 1. 55 Additionally, the Court
stated that analysis under rule of reason requires the fact-finder
to weigh all the facts of a case to determine whether a restrictive
practice imposes an undue restraint on competition.56 The case
illustrated the judicial preference under section 1 for rule of
reason analysis but failed to give anything but arbitrary
direction on how to complete that analysis.
Judicial preference for rule of reason analysis under section
1 was reinforced by National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,5 7 where the Court reviewed the historical
Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), the Court stated, "[Tihere are
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Contl T.V., 433 U.S. at 50.
For the purposes of this discussion, "vertical restraints" may be defined as
"[a]nticompetitive agreements between entities operating at different levels of
market structure, such as manufacturers and distributors." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1562 (6th ed. 1990).
50 See Contl T.V., 433 U.S. at 59.
51 Id. at 41.
52 Id. at 58-59. The Court concluded that the distinction made in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), was incorrect. Arnold, Schwinn had
made a distinction between sale and non-sale transactions within a vertical
arrangement to determine whether analysis should be under the rule of reason or
per se rule. See Cont'l T.V., 433 U.S. at 57. This distinction was deemed an
inadequate basis upon which to make a determination of which analytic approach to
use. Id. at 57-58.
53 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 66 (stating that the opinion did more than
simply establish the lines between rule of reason and per se analysis; it also
"signaled a new approach to antitrust analysis that continues to the present day'l.
54 Id.
55 See Cont'l T.V., 433 U.S. at 49.
56 See id. (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
57 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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development of rule of reason analysis.58 The Court stated that
the rule of reason required an analysis of facts relating to the
business, the history of the restraint on competition, and why
the restraint was imposed.59 Additionally, the Court stated that
"[t]he Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents
long antedating the Sherman Act, has... been used to give the
Act both flexibility and definition."60 As illustrated in the above
cases, however, the rule of reason lacks definition beyond mere
words, and questions remain concerning the degree of analysis to
be utilized, and the particular factors to be considered, in
determining whether a restraint unduly restricts competition.
In the mid 1980s, the Supreme Court reviewed three
separate cases that highlight the inherent confusion surrounding
analysis of alleged restraints under section 1.61 Each case was
evaluated under the rule of reason. In NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma,62 the Court held that the
NCAA had unreasonably restrained trade with regards to the
televising of college football games.63 Although the Court
acknowledged that horizontal price fixing and output limitations
are generally deemed to be per se violations, a per se evaluation
was inappropriate in this case.64 Instead, rule of reason analysis
was utilized because the Court felt horizontal restraints on
competition were essential to the production of football games.65
The Court stated, however, that regardless of whether the
per se rule or the rule of reason is utilized, both retain the same
58 See id. at 687-92. The Court stated that under the rule of reason tihe true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition." Id. at 691.
59 See id. at 692 (noting that these factors help to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint).
60 Id. at 688.
61 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); N.W. Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
62 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
63 Id. at 88.
64 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 100. Horizontal price
fixing is defined as "[aigreements between producers, wholesalers, or retailers as to
sale or resale prices. Price fixing among businesses on the same level the effect of
which is to eliminate competition based on price." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 737
(6th ed. 1990).
65 See id at 101-03 (describing the nature of college football and how it is
governed by the NCAA).
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inquiry: "[W]hether or not the challenged restraint enhances
competition."66 The Court also stated that the per se rule and
the rule of reason are utilized "to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint."67 The preceding two
statements seem to acknowledge the continued merging of the
two initially separate lines of evaluation for alleged antitrust
restraints.
Two noteworthy cases decided by the Supreme Court during
the 1980s questioned the standard to be applied when analyzing
group boycotts. 68 Historically, group boycotts were evaluated
under the per se rule.69 The Court decided, however, that in
each case the facts should be analyzed under the rule of reason.70
Both cases seem to show the continued erosion of per se analysis
under section 1 and the continued expansion of categories that
fit within rule of reason analysis. Thus, it seems likely that
competitive restraints attributed to a B2B Web site will be
analyzed under the rule of reason; however, the amount of
analysis and what factors should be utilized remains uncertain.
The most recent Supreme Court case to use rule of reason
analysis was California Dental Ass'n v. FTC.7i The substantive
antitrust issue was whether advertising restrictions adopted by
the California Dental Association were unreasonable restraints
on competition2 2 The court of appeals held, as a matter of law,
that "truncated rule of reason analysis"73 was sufficient to decide
66 Id. at 104. The Court noted that often no "bright line" separates rule of
reason analysis from per se analysis because the per se rule may require substantial
inquiry into relevant market conditions before a presumption can be formulated
that anticompetitive conduct has occurred. Id. at 104 n.26.
67 Id. at 103 (citing .Natl Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978)).
68 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); N.W.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290
(1985). "Group boycott" is defined as a "concerted refusal by traders to deal with
other traders." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 704 (6th ed. 1990). They may occur "when
competitors combine to exclude a would-be competitor by threatening to withhold
their business from firms that deal with the potential competitor." Id.
69 See Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458.
70 See id. at 458-59 (noting that when the economic impact of a restraint is not
immediately obvious, the restraint will be evaluated under the rule of reason); N.W.
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296-97 (stating that expulsion from a wholesale
cooperative does not always indicate anticompetitive effect and applying rule of
reason analysis).
71 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
72 See id. at 759.
73 "Quick look" or "truncated" rule of reason analysis was introduced by the
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whether the advertising restrictions were unreasonable
restraints on competition.7 4 The Court, in determining what
type of analysis was necessary, stated that the threshold issue
was whether price and advertising were "sufficiently verifiable
in theory and in fact" such that they fit within the general
abbreviated rule of reason.75 Justice Souter stated that since
each party had plausible competing claims as to the competitive
effect of the advertising, abbreviated review was inapplicable. 76
Based upon the current understanding of how B2B Web sites
operate,"7 abbreviated review would seem similarly inapplicable
in this context.
Justice Souter explained, in dicta, some of the inherent
difficulties in predicting the application of rule of reason analysis
to alleged restraints on competition. He stated, "The truth is
that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less
fixed than terms like !per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason'
tend to make them appear."7 8 Furthermore, he underscored that
"there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of
Reason analysis."79 Thus, with the application of either rule, the
central inquiry is "whether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition."80 Justice Souter emphasized that there
is a "sliding scale" nature to "appraising reasonableness" and it
is essential that the logic behind a court's decision be explained
Supreme Court as a way to avoid the complicated uncertainty of rule of reason
analysis. See Hartley, supra note 20, at 100. The essence of truncated rule of reason
analysis was to find a way to streamline full rule of reason analysis. See id.
74 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999). The Court noted that
three prior cases had formed the basis for abbreviated or "quick look' analysis. See
id. at 770 (citing Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)), NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), and Nat'l Soc. of Profl Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)). The Court further noted that in each of these
cases a person with "even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in questions would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets." Id.; see also Hartley, supra note 20, at 101 (stating that
truncated rule of reason analysis was recently limited in California Dental to
situations where the "great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be
ascertained").
75 Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 771.
76 See id. at 778.
77 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
76 Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 779.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 780 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
104 (1984)).
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within the opinion.8 ' Justice Souter's statements within
California Dental exemplify the inherent confusion that
surrounds rule of reason analysis. Although Justice Souter
addressed the central inquiry under antitrust analysis, the
opinion provides little guidance on proceeding with a B2B
antitrust analysis. Justice Souter explained the central inquiry
by stating that reasonableness should be analyzed with a
"sliding scale," a term which is inherently ambiguous.
The preceding Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the
prevailing standard of review under section 1 is the rule of
reason. It is also clear that the central question under a rule of
reason analysis is whether the restraint enhances competition or
harms competition. Certainty and predictability for potential
litigants appear to end at that point. Since Chicago Board of
Trade, there has been little, if any, elaboration or innovation on
how to analyze a restraint under the rule of reason. The two
principal concerns that must be addressed are what factors are
to be utilized for rule of reason analysis and how much analysis
should go into a particular fact-finder's judgment.
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
As a recent innovation in the Internet economy, B2B sites
have raised concerns among antitrust regulators.8 2  If an
information exchange is alleged to have facilitated illegal
behavior, such as collusion, exclusion, or exclusivity, there are
different approaches to antitrust analysis depending upon
whether a court or an enforcement agency is reviewing the
allegations.
A. Enforcement Agencies
Recently, the DOJ in conjunction with the FTC issued
guidelines for collaborations among competitors. 83 Although
81 Id. at 780 (quoting PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1507, at 402 n.15
(1986)).
82 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
83 See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 17.
This Note views the ANTITRUST GUIDELINES as the best current tool for B2B
Web sites to follow since it is an official report. See FTC Staff Report, supra note 2,
Introduction, at 1 n.1 (noting that the report only represents the views of the FTC
staff and not necessarily the views of the Commission or of any individual
Commissioner). The FTC Staff Report seeks to summarize what was learned at a
public workshop held on B2Bs and to lay a foundation on how to answer traditional
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B2B Web sites are not specifically mentioned, the publication is
a useful guide because B2B sites will likely be treated as joint
ventures.8 The publication specifically outlines how and why
particular activities will be analyzed under the rule of reason
standard.85 Section 3.3 of the guidelines illustrates the lack of
predictability that accompanies rule of reason analysis.8 6 The
guidelines state that rule of reason analysis focuses upon the
state of competition with, for example, a B2B joint venture
versus the state of competition without the joint venture.8 7 The
central question for the FTC and the DOJ "is whether the
relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the
ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce
output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would
prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement."88 Then, in an
extremely general statement, the guidelines state that rule of
reason analysis will entail a "flexible inquiry [that] varies in
focus and detail depending on the nature of the agreement and
market circumstances."89 The guidelines further state that the
inquiry will proceed only to the level necessary to make a
decision on the overall competitive effect of an agreement, and
that no one fact will be dispositive.90
The Agencies start their analysis by examining the nature of
the relevant agreement, determining its purpose, and deciding
whether the agreement has caused anticompetitive harm.91 If
there is an absence of market power and the nature of the
agreement reveals no anticompetitive effect, then the inquiry
ends. If there is an indication or likelihood of anticompetitive
antitrust questions. See id. Introduction, at 2. The report indicates the staffs hope
that this foundation will serve to create further dialogue to promote both antitrust
compliance and the potential efficiencies that B2Bs promise. See id.
84 See FTC Enforcers, supra note 8, at aai; Donovan, supra note 13, at 1 (stating
that the DOJ/FTC guidelines, although not addressing B2Bs directly, are at this
time the best source of guidance from the government).
85 See AMITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 3.
88 See id. at 10 ("Rule of reason analysis entails a flexible inquiry and varies in
focus and detail depending on the nature of the agreement and market
circumstances.").
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. (stating that the nature of the agreement enables the Agencies to
determine what types of anticompetitive harms may be of concern).
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harm, then the agreement is challenged by the Agencies. 92 Since
B2B Web sites have overriding competitive benefits, any alleged
anticompetitive behavior requires a detailed market analysis. 93
The approach suggested by the DOJ and the FTC is so general in
nature that it leaves competitors that form B2Bs with no sense
of predictability in a potential inquiry. Competitors do know
that any inquiry will likely be completed under the rule of reason
analysis. Since the inquiry under the rule of reason is "flexible,"
however, B2B joint venturers do not know how to avoid an
antitrust violation under section 1. Additionally, there is little
predictability concerning the cost of litigation or whether they
are likely to succeed on the merits.
B. Courts of Appeals
A second approach is one used quite often by the appellate
courts.9 4 This approach requires a prospective plaintiff to show
that an agreement, such as a B2B Web site, "had or is likely to
have a substantially adverse effect on competition."95 If the
plaintiff meets this initial burden of proof, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to show potential procompetitive effects of the
alleged restraint in violation of section 1.96 The courts have
acknowledged that valid procompetitive effects include
agreements that facilitate the creation of a new product, expand
output, or improve consumer choice.9 7 If each party sustains
92 See id. at 10-11.
93 See id.; see also supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (discussing the
contributions to the economy that B2B Web sites can make and the potential benefit
to consumers).
94 See Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But
Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 520 (2000) (stating that many courts of
appeals utilize a burden-shifting model when analyzing restraints of trade under -
the rule of reason).
95 Id.; see also Hartley, supra note 20, at 104 (stating that a plaintiff can
normally show an adverse effect on competition "in one of three ways: (1) by proof of
a 'naked' restraint, such as price fixing...; (2) proof of an actual effect on
competition; or (3) by proof that the restraint will create or contribute to the
exercise of market power"). It is problematic that a "full-scale rule of reason analysis
requires a detailed and exhaustive examination of the relevant market as a first
step in evaluating the competitive effect of the alleged restraint." Id. at 105. Such
an approach would seem to increase the cost of litigation not only for the potential
plaintiff, but also for the defendant, at the very outset of rule of reason analysis.
Again, this provides a lack of predictability.
96 See Calkins, supra note 94, at 520.
97 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 117.
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their initial burden, a court would then require the plaintiff to
show that "the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the stated objective."98 If the preceding three steps are
satisfied, a court would then balance the anticompetitive effects
of a B2B Web site against the procompetitive benefits.99 This
approach illustrates the lack of predictability and stability
within the body of antitrust law under rule of reason analysis.
In addition to the great expense to both parties, there is limited
guidance on how the different factors will be balanced under rule
of reason analysis. 00
C. Supreme Court
The third potential approach, as espoused by the United
States Supreme Court, makes it clear that there is no true
method to the rule of reason.10 The enunciation of the rule of
reason begins and ends with Chicago Board of Trade.0 2 From
the list of illustrative factors in Chicago Board of Trade, the
Supreme Court has stated that a rule of reason inquiry asks
"whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes
competition or one that suppresses competition."10 3 The rule of
reason has been viewed as "a vague listing of factors" that fails
93 Calkins, supra note 94, at 521. This provides a plaintiff with the "opportunity
to demonstrate that there is an insufficient nexus between the restraint and the
procompetitive effect." Hartley, supra note 20, at 121.
99 See Calkins, supra note 94, at 521 n.127 ("[Tihe harms and benefits must be
weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on
balance, reasonable.") (quoting Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998)).
100 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 125 (pointing out that lower courts are often
uncomfortable undertaking this balancing inquiry); see also Rothery Storage & Van
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 229-30 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[Although] it
[may be] necessary to weigh procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects,
we do not think that a useable formula if it implies an ability to quantify the two
effects and compare the values found.").
101 See Hartley, supra note 20, at 125 ("The Supreme Court has not provided
practical guidance on how to perform the required balancing, the weight to be given
various factors, or the analytical rigor with which the balancing must be done.").
102 See Calkins, supra note 94, at 520 (noting that theoretically, rule of reason
analysis can be found in Chicago Board of Trade); see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
103 Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). The
Court then stated that "[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. (quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade,
246 U.S. at 238).
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to guide courts or litigants. 10 4 The factors listed in Chicago
Board of Trade generally lead to higher litigation costs since the
rule of reason is normally applied in cases that have high
financial stakes. Moreover, discovery can become ceaseless due
to the very realistic chance of an unpredictable outcome. 105
Faced with the apparent uncertainty surrounding Supreme
Court precedent, the status of B2B Web sites remains unclear.
III. B2B WEB SITES UTILIZED AS INFORMATION EXCHANGES
This Note specifically focuses on the B2B Web site receiving
the most attention from the FTC, Covisint. 06 Three competitors
in the automobile industry, Ford Motor Company, General
Motors Corporation and DaimlerChrysler AG, announced the
formation of the exchange in February of 2000.107 Each
manufacturer had been planning to open its own individual
proprietary trade exchanges when they decided to operate a
single trading site.108 Given the amount of money involved, it
seems reasonable for these competitive companies to join
forces. 10 9 In addition to the potential revenues that Covisint will
generate, efficiencies will be found in price, service, and
delivery.110
The auto trade exchange has a stated two-pronged goal of
primary concern: cutting costs through streamlining the
purchasing process while letting suppliers leverage the auto-
makers buying power for additional discounts."' When viewing
the auto trade exchange through an antitrust lens,
procompetitive benefits are readily apparent, whether they are
104 Piraino, supra note 22, at 1754-55; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984) (stating that the factors forming the
basis for a rule of reason inquiry are empty formulations). Easterbrook states that
when all factors are relevant "nothing is dispositive." Id. Any factor might outweigh
another, or one factor could outweigh all others. Id.
105 See Easterbrook, supra note 104, at 12-13 (stating that rule of reason
formulations offer no help to a business planning its conduct and, therefore, can
lead to ceaseless discovery within the course of litigation).
106 See Hicks, supra note 10, at 56 (stating that the auto-industry B2B
marketplace, Covisint, is facing scrutiny).
107 See id.
108 See Paul, supra note 5.
109 See id. (estimating that when the joint venture goes public it will have a
potential market capitalization of between $30 billion and $40 billion with annual
revenues of around $3 billion).
110 See id.
"I See id.
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for supply companies or individuals purchasing automobiles. 112
Supplier savings have been estimated at $695 per car, while auto
manufacturers project a savings of $368 per vehicle. 113
The B2B arena as a whole is certainly within its infancy.
Very little is known about the long-term implications of the
e-marketplace on competition.114 The FTC's fixation on the B2B
marketplace can be attributed to a variety of faptors.115 These
include the fact that a number of B2Bs represent big business
and that a large number of B2B ventures "involve collaborative
arrangements between horizontal competitors."116 In addition,
B2Bs are a new Internet-based platform, which is largely
uncharted territory for regulators." 7
A. Present Developments of B2B Sites
Currently, the FTC, DOJ, and other enforcement agencies
should leave B2B information exchanges alone and proceed with
an open mind.118 As stated earlier, a first step under rule of
reason analysis is to define the relevant market through a
detailed and exhaustive examination. 119 It is highly unlikely
that an enforcement agency or private plaintiff would be able to
complete this type of evaluation since B2B Web sites are in their
infancy and nobody has ever tried to define such a market. One
initial question that might arise is whether the market should be
defined by looking at the collaborating competitors or whether
the B2B Web site should be the relevant market. The most
important question is how B2B Web sites should be evaluated
112 See id. (noting that General Motors believes that the time it takes to
produce an online car order can be reduced from forty-five days to ten days and that
fast communication regarding the availability of and need for parts will ultimately
lower costs).
123 See id.
114 See Schwinger, supra note 10, at Si (stating that the Internet and World
Wide Web have been a "boon from an antitrust perspective" due to enhanced
competition and new markets, but that concern has also arisen over whether B2B
marketplaces may implicate antitrust laws).
115 See Jones Day, supra note 1, at 2.
116 Id.
117 Id.
11s See id. ("In sum, the B2B buzzword is not a unitary concept, and it is simply
not susceptible to 'one-size-fits-all' antitrust analysis."). Based upon the results of
the B2B public workshop hosted by the FTC and summarized in the FTC Staff
Report, supra note 2, enforcement agencies seem to be willing to wait and see how
B2Bs develop before pressing forward with new regulations or litigation.
119 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act when there is
greater economic certainty with respect to their effect on
competition.
B. Future Concerns Regarding B2B Sites
One must first presume that a private plaintiff or
enforcement agency will allege that a B2B Web site, such as
Covisint, is engaging in behavior that restrains trade, thereby
restraining competition, in violation of section 1. Such behavior
would probably entail an allegation of either collusion or some
type of limitation on participation within the particular B2B
site.120 In the most recent decision from the Supreme Court,
California Dental,121 the Court listed three methods for analysis
under section 1, namely "per se," "quick look," and the "rule of
reason."122 The Court recognized that "there is often no bright
line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis," because
both may require a substantial inquiry into market conditions.m
As discussed, this Note starts from the premise that perceived
restraints involving B2B Web sites will be analyzed under the
rule of reason. 24
Initially, one must consider whether a court would utilize
"quick look" rule of reason analysis or conduct a more detailed
inquiry. Analysis utilizing "quick look," "truncated," or
"abbreviated" rule of reason would be unlikely within the context
of a B2B information exchange. 25 This is a fairly safe conclusion
due to the overwhelming consensus that B2B information
exchanges offer economies of scale to the participants and
therefore benefit consumers through cost savings126 Because
any anticompetitive concerns would face competing
procompetitive benefits, a full rule of reason analysis involving a
120 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
121 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
122 See id. at 779.
123 Id.
124 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
125 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999) (stating that when
each party has competing plausible claims as to the competitive effects of an alleged
restraint, abbreviated review under the rule of reason is inapplicable); see also
supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
126 See Foster, supra note 6, at B3 (stating that federal regulators have not
issued guidelines for exchanges to follow as they are fearful of stifling
procompetitive behavior); see also supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
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balancing test would be required. 127 Based upon the decision in
California Dental, review under the rule of reason falls back to
the essential inquiry: "[Wihether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition."12 In order to determine whether a
restraint enhances competition, the Court would likely apply a
heightened examination approaching a full rule of reason
analysis. 129
As noted within Part II of this Note, the Supreme Court,
courts of appeals, and the enforcement agencies, fail to present a
uniform method of applying the rule of reason that would allow
these types of analyses to have predictability and uniformity in
terms of inquiry or outcome. Rule of reason analysis, therefore,
seems filled with ambiguity and does not provide a solid
foundation to combat restraints on competition.
The Supreme Court, in California Dental, unanimously
determined that a sliding scale approach to rule of reason
analysis should be used. 30 The overriding question, however, is
how one predicts the outcome when employing rule of reason
analysis based upon a sliding scale. Courts may follow Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion in determining whether a restraint
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.131  Justice Breyer
suggested courts should ask "four classical, subsidiary antitrust
questions: What is the specific restraint at issue? What are its
likely anti-competitive effects? Are there offsetting
procompetitive justifications? Do the parties have sufficient
market power to make a difference?"132
There are other innovative ways in which structure can be
added before undertaking full rule of reason analysis. 133
Easterbrook recommends using presumptions called filters. 134
The first two filters would require a plaintiff to show that the
in See Hartley, supra note 20, at 124 (stating that when the plaintiff has
proven anticompetitive effects and the defendant has shown procompetitive
benefits, the competing claims must be balanced).
IM Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780.
129 See id. at 779-81.
130 See Calkins, supra note 94, at 557 (pointing out that Justice Breyer, in his
dissent, agreed with the majority that antitrust should employ a sliding scale for
rule of reason analysis).
131 See id.
132 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 782.
133 See Easterbrook, supra note 104, at 14 (suggesting that courts should utilize
simple presumptions as a way of adding structure to an antitrust inquiry).
134 See id.
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defendant has market power and has the opportunity to enrich
himself by harming consumers. 135 If the court moved beyond the
first two filters, the third filter would require the court to ask
whether competitors in the industry utilized different methods of
production and distribution.136 An answer in the affirmative to
the third filter question would demonstrate that there was
adequate competition. If not, the court would move to the fourth
filter.137 The fourth filter would require the court to ask whether
the evidence indicates a reduction in output.138 The fifth and
final filter would require the court to ask whether the party that
brought the lawsuit was a business rival, in which case, it could
be inferred that the practice benefits consumers. 139 Although
these filters would not replace the need for a full rule of reason
analysis in all cases, if applied, they would offer needed
structure to the inquiry and thereby help eliminate
uncertainty. 140 Whether following the thoughts expressed in
Justice Breyer's dissent in California Dental or using a filter
approach, guidance is needed when attempting to evaluate the
competitive effects of a restraint under rule of reason analysis.
CONCLUSION
B2B Web sites present a wonderful opportunity for the
continued development of the American economy. There are
estimates that B2B sites will generate trillions of dollars within
the Internet economy over the next five years. In addition,
business will be completed in an increasingly efficient way,
forming the basis for a stronger free market economy. Increased
efficiency promotes increased competition.
It is imperative that enforcement agencies and courts adopt
structured principles when reviewing practices that restrain
135 See id. at 17-18. This would shift the focus initially towards an examination
of whether the defendants had incentives to act in an anticompetitive way. See id. at
18.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. This inquiry would require determining whether there were changes
in the output after the alleged practice was adopted and also whether the
defendants' market share had been reduced or increased with the use of the
practice. Id.
139 See id. (asserting that the fifth filter "uses the identity of the plaintiff to
infer something about the consequences of the defendants' conduct").
140 See id. (noting that filters will lead to savings in litigation costs and will
allow courts to focus attention on the more important issues).
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competition under antitrust law. This Note asserts that whether
or not a B2B site is restraining competition in violation of
antitrust law, current analysis under the rule of reason is
inadequate to determine the ultimate effect of the restraint. The
Supreme Court should offer, at its earliest opportunity,
meaningful guidance on how to employ rule of reason analysis.
This will enable businesses to properly set up practices that do
not violate antitrust law and decrease the huge sums of money
spent litigating antitrust cases under the rule of reason.
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